In philosophy of mind, people sometimes say things like the following: If functionalism is true about consciousness, then digital computers could be conscious; all it requires is that they instantiate the right programs.
That makes sense. I'd be interested in your view on non-physicalist functionalism - which seems compatible with bare functionalism at least. And how you think of digital computationalism and arbitrary approximation to analog computational functionalism because it seems to me absent special pleading they would tend to collapse into each other.
I wouldn't rule out non-physicalist functionalism, though my default assumption tends to be physicalism. On approximating analog computation: Yes, but not necessarily efficiently, and on some views that might matter.
A computational model of a hurricane gets no one wet — I keep wondering whether consciousness is more like the hurricane or more like the arithmetic that describes it.
I always say I'm a functionalist first and a computationalist second. Although I lot hinges on what we mean by "computation." My definition is fairly broad, something like a complex causal nexus whose core components operate within a low tight energy range.
The digital computationalist version assumes that a discrete system can adequately reproduce the operations of a semi-continuous system like the brain. The fact that we listen to music and watch movies all the time that were originally analog make me think this isn't a showstopper. The one area where it might have bite is energy efficiency. Currently digital systems need a lot more power to even approach what the brain does with 20 watts.
[typo the first, if interested: risker (I’m assuming riskier)]
That makes sense. I'd be interested in your view on non-physicalist functionalism - which seems compatible with bare functionalism at least. And how you think of digital computationalism and arbitrary approximation to analog computational functionalism because it seems to me absent special pleading they would tend to collapse into each other.
I wouldn't rule out non-physicalist functionalism, though my default assumption tends to be physicalism. On approximating analog computation: Yes, but not necessarily efficiently, and on some views that might matter.
A computational model of a hurricane gets no one wet — I keep wondering whether consciousness is more like the hurricane or more like the arithmetic that describes it.
I always say I'm a functionalist first and a computationalist second. Although I lot hinges on what we mean by "computation." My definition is fairly broad, something like a complex causal nexus whose core components operate within a low tight energy range.
The digital computationalist version assumes that a discrete system can adequately reproduce the operations of a semi-continuous system like the brain. The fact that we listen to music and watch movies all the time that were originally analog make me think this isn't a showstopper. The one area where it might have bite is energy efficiency. Currently digital systems need a lot more power to even approach what the brain does with 20 watts.