New Essay in Draft: The Pragmatic Metaphysics of Belief
Available here.
As always, comments and criticisms welcome, either by email to my address or in the comments section on this post.
Abstract:
Suppose someone intellectually assents to a proposition but fails to act and react generally as though that proposition is true. Does she believe the proposition? Intellectualist approaches will say she does believe it. They align belief with sincere, reflective judgment, downplaying the importance of habitual, spontaneous reaction and unreflective assumption. Broad-based approaches, which do not privilege the intellectual and reflective over the spontaneous and habitual in matters of belief, will refrain from ascribing belief or treat it as an intermediate case. Both views are viable, so it is open to us to choose which view to prefer on pragmatic grounds. I argue that since “belief” is a term of central importance in philosophy of mind, philosophy of action, and epistemology, we should use it to label most important phenomenon in the vicinity that can plausibly answer to it. The most important phenomenon in the vicinity is not our patterns of intellectual endorsement but rather our overall lived patterns of action and reaction. Too intellectualist a view risks hiding the importance of lived behavior, especially when that behavior does not match our ideals and self-conception, inviting us to noxiously comfortable views of ourselves.
The Pragmatic Metaphysics of Belief (in draft)
(I'll be giving a version of this paper as talk at USC on Friday, by the way.)
Related Posts:
On Being Blameworthy for Unwelcome Thoughts, Reactions, and Biases (Mar 19, 2015)
Against Intellectualism about Belief (Jul 31, 2015)
Pragmatic Metaphysics (Feb 11, 2016)