What Do Analytic Philosophers Analyze? (by guest blogger Jonathan Ichikawa)
Hello, Splintered Mind readers! I'm pleased to be guest-blogging, and
thanks to Eric for the invitation. I'm looking forward to some good
discussions over the next couple of weeks.
I thought I'd start off with a question in philosophical methodology.
There's a certain kind of disagreement that sometimes comes up about
how to go about doing philosophy -- it connects to lots of deep
issues, and from the way people talk about it, it sure seems like it's
a big ideological disagreement, but I have a pretty hard time wrapping
my head around just what the disagreement is supposed to be.
The debate I have in mind tends to occur between traditional
philosophers who think that lots of interesting philosophy is a
priori, and philosophers who think that we have to go out and do
empirical investigation to learn anything interesting. Roughly -- and
only roughly -- speaking, some philosophers like thought experiments,
and others like psychological experiments.
Sometimes, I feel debate between these camps goes something like this.
Maybe I'm caricaturing, but I don't think so:
Archie: I'm using a priori investigation to learn about the
nature of knowledge.
Eddie: When you say 'knowledge', are you talking about something out
there in the world? Or are you just studying the concept of
knowledge?
Archie: Oh, I definitely am interested in knowledge out there in
the world. I'm using a priori investigation to learn which
things are instances of knowledge -- that thing out there in
the world.
Eddie: That's hopeless. How can a priori investigation teach
you something about something out there in the world? At best, a
priori investigation could give you insight into which things fall
under the concept knowledge. That's a merely psychological
matter.
Archie: No, it's not just a psychological question -- I agree that
would be uninteresting. I'm learning about the nature of knowledge,
that thing in the world!
You may anticipate my confusion from the way I set up this dialogue.
I can't see what this disagreement is supposed to be about. Here are
the two questions that we're supposed to be contrasting:
(1) Which things are knowledge?
(2) Which things fall under the concept KNOWLEDGE?
But these two questions are identical. Or, at least they're
equivalent. For after all, it is a tautology that all and only things
that are knowledge are things that fall under the concept KNOWLEDGE.
So what is it that this disagreement is supposed to be about? It
can't be that Armchair Archie is illicitly attempting to adjudicate
from the armchair what actual cases of knowledge there are in the
world, because this would be an obvious and ridiculous mistake. It
can't be that Experimental Eddie's question presupposes that
'knowledge' is a natural kind term, because it doesn't; "which things
are trains?" has just the same structure as "which things are
knowledge?", and nobody thinks trains are natural kinds.
(Furthermore, "Which things fall under the concept WATER?" can't be
answered a priori.)
So what gives? Is there a genuine disagreement in the ballpark?