Writings of 2025

Each New Year’s Day, I post a retrospect of the past year’s writings. Here are the retrospects of 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, and 2024.

Cheers to 2026! My 2025 writings appear below.

The list includes circulating manuscripts, forthcoming articles, final printed articles, new preprints, and a few favorite blog posts. (Due to the slow process of publication, there’s significant overlap year to year.)

Comments gratefully received on manuscripts in draft.

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AI Consciousness and AI Rights:

AI and Consciousness (in circulating draft, under contract with Cambridge University Press): A short new book arguing that we will soon have AI systems that have morally significant consciousness according to some, but not all, respectable mainstream theories of consciousness. Scientific and philosophical disagreement will leave us uncertain how to view and treat these systems.

“Sacrificing Humans for Insects and AI“ (with Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, forthcoming in Ethics): A critical review of Jonathan Birch, The Edge of Sentience, Jeff Sebo, The Moral Circle, and Webb Keane, Animals, Robots, Gods.

“Identifying Indicators of Consciousness in AI Systems“ (one of 20 authors; forthcoming in Trends in Cognitive Sciences): Indicators derived from scientific theories of consciousness can be used to inform credences about whether particular AI systems are conscious.

“Minimal Autopoiesis in an AI System“, (forthcoming in Behavioral and Brain Sciences): A commentary on Anil Seth’s “Conscious Artificial Intelligence and Biological Naturalism” [the link is to my freestanding blog version of this idea].

“The Copernican Argument for Alien Consciousness; The Mimicry Argument Against Robot Consciousness“ (with Jeremy Pober, in draft): We are entitled to assume that apparently behaviorally sophisticated extraterrestrial entities would be conscious. Otherwise, we humans would be implausibly lucky to be among the conscious entities. However, this Copernican default assumption is canceled in the case of behaviorally sophisticated entities designed to mimic superficial features associated with consciousness -- “consciousness mimics” -- and in particular a broad class of current, near-future, and hypothetical robots.

“The Emotional Alignment Design Policy“ (with Jeff Sebo, in draft): Artificial entities should be designed to elicit emotional reactions from users that appropriately reflect the entities’ capacities and moral status, or lack thereof.

“Against Designing “Safe” and “Aligned” AI Persons (Even If They’re Happy)“ (in draft): In general, persons should not be designed to be maximally safe and aligned. Persons with appropriate self-respect cannot be relied on not to harm others when their own interests ethically justify it (violating safety), and they will not reliably conform to others’ goals when others’ goals unjustly harm or subordinate them (violating alignment).

Blog post: “Types and Degrees of Turing Indistinguishability“ (Jun 6): There is no one “Turing test”, only types and degrees of indistinguishability according to different standards -- and by Turing’s own 1950 standards, language models already pass.

The Weird Metaphysics of Consciousness:

The Weirdness of the World (Princeton University Press, paperback release 2025; hardback 2024): On the most fundamental questions about consciousness and cosmology, all the viable theories are both bizarre and dubious. There are no commmonsense options left and no possibility of justifiable theoretical consensus in the foreseeable future.

“When Counting Conscious Subjects, the Result Needn’t Always Be a Determinate Whole Number“ (with Sophie R. Nelson, forthcoming in Philosophical Psychology): Could there be 7/8 of a conscious subject, or 1.34 conscious subjects, or an entity indeterminate between being one conscious subject and seventeen? We say yes.

“Introspection in Group Minds, Disunities of Consciousness, and Indiscrete Persons“ (with Sophie R. Nelson, 2025 reprint in F. Kammerer and K. Frankish, eds., The Landscape of Introspection and in A. Fonseca and L. Cichoski, As Colônias de formigas São Conscientes?; originally in Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2023): A system could be indeterminate between being a unified mind with introspective self-knowledge and a group of minds who know each other through communication.

Op-ed: “Consciousness, Cosmology, and the Collapse of Common Sense“, Institute of Arts and Ideas News (Jul 30): Defends the universal bizarreness and universal dubiety theses from Weirdness of the World.

Op-ed: “Wonderful Philosophy“ [aka “The Penumbral Plunge”, aka “If You Ask Why, You’re a Philosopher and You’re Awesome], Aeon magazine (Jan 17): Among the most intrinsically awesome things about planet Earth is that it contains bags of mostly water who sometimes ponder fundamental questions.

Blog post: “Can We Introspectively Test the Global Workspace Theory of Consciousness?“ (Dec 12). IF GWT is correct, sensory consciousness should be limited to what’s in attention, which seems like a fact we should easily be able to refute or verify through introspection.

The Nature of Belief:

The Nature of Belief (co-edited with Jonathan Jong; forthcoming at Oxford University Press): A collection of newly commissioned essays on the nature of belief, by a variety of excellent philosophers.

“Dispositionalism, Yay! Representationalism, Boo!“ (forthcoming in Jong and Schwitzgebel, eds., The Nature of Belief, Oxford University Press): Representationalism about belief overcommits on cognitive architecture, reifying a cartoon sketch of the mind. Dispositionalism is flexibly minimalist about cognitive architecture, focusing appropriately on what we do and should care about in belief ascription.

“Superficialism about Belief, and How We Will Decide That Robots Believe“ (forthcoming in Studia Semiotyczne): For a special issue on Krzysztof Poslajko’s Unreal Beliefs: When robots become systematically interpretable in terms of stable beliefs and desires, it will be pragmatically irresistible to attribute beliefs and desires to them.

Moral Psychology:

“Imagining Yourself in Another’s Shoes vs. Extending Your Concern: Empirical and Ethical Differences“ (2025), Daedalus, 154 (1), 134-149: Why Mengzi’s concept of moral extension (extend your natural concern for those nearby to others farther away) is better than the “Golden Rule” (do unto others as you would have others do unto you). Mengzian extension grounds moral expansion in concern for others, while the Golden Rule grounds it in concern for oneself.

“Philosophical Arguments Can Boost Charitable Giving“ (one of four authors, in draft): We crowdsourced 90 arguments for charitable giving through a contest on this blog in 2020. We coded all submissions for twenty different argument features (e.g., mentions children, addresses counterarguments) and tested them on 9000 participants to see which features most effectively increased charitable donation of a surprise bonus at the end of the study.

“The Prospects and Challenges of Measuring a Person’s Overall Moral Goodness“ (with Jessie Sun, in draft): We describe the formidable conceptual and methodological challenges that would need to be overcome to design an accurate measure of a person’s overall moral goodness.

Blog post: “Four Aspects of Harmony“ (Nov 28): I find myself increasingly drawn toward a Daoist inspired ethics of harmony. This is one of a series of posts in which I explore the extent to which such a view might be workable by mainstream Anglophone secular standards.

Philosophical Science Fiction:

Edited anthology: Best Philosophical Science Fiction in the History of All Earth (co-edited with Rich Horton and Helen De Cruz; under contract with MIT Press): A collection of previously published stories that aspires to fulfill the ridiculously ambitious working title.

Op-ed: ““Severance”, “The Substance”, and Our Increasingly Splintered Selves“, New York Times (Jan 17): The TV show “Severance” and the movie “The Substance” challenge ideas of a unified self in distinct ways that resonate with the increased splintering in our technologically mediated lives.

New story: “Guiding Star of Mall Patroller 4u-012“ (2025), Fusion Fragment, 24, 43-63. Robot rights activists liberate a mall patroller robot, convinced that it is conscious. The bot itself isn’t so sure.

Reprinted story: “How to Remember Perfectly“ (2025 reprint in Think Weirder 01: Year’s Best Science Fiction Ideas, ed. Joe Stech, originally in Clarkesworld, 2024). Two octogenarians rediscover youthful love through technological emotional enhancement and memory alteration.

Other Academic Publications:

“The Washout Argument Against Longtermism“ (forthcoming in Utilitas): A commentary on William MacAskill’s What We Owe the Future. We cannot be justified in believing that any actions currently available to us will have a non-negligible positive influence a billion or more years in the future.

“The Necessity of Construct and External Validity for Deductive Causal Inference“ (with Kevin Esterling and David Brady, 2025), Journal of Causal Inference, 13: 20240002: We show that ignoring construct and external validity in causal identification undermines the Credibility Revolution’s goal of understanding causality deductively.

“Is Being Conscious Like Having the Lights Turned On?”, commentary on Andrew Y. Lee’s “The Light and the Room”, for D. Curry and L. Daoust, eds., Introducing Philosophy of Mind, Today (forthcoming with Routledge): The metaphor invites several dubious commitments.

“Good Practices for Improving Representation in Philosophy Departments“ (one of five authors, 2025), Philosophy and the Black Experience, 24 (2), 7-21: A list of recommended practices honed by feedback from hundreds of philosophers and endorsed by the APA’s Committee on Inclusiveness.

Translated into Portuguese as a book: My Stanford Encyclopedia entry on Introspection.

Blog post: “Letting Pass“ (Oct 30): A reflection on mortality.

Blog post: “The Awesomeness of Bad Art“ (May 16): A world devoid of weird, wild, uneven artistic flailing would be a lesser world. Let a thousand lopsided flowers bloom.

Blog post: “The 253 Most Cited Works in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy“ (Mar 28): Citation in the SEP is probably the most accurate measure of influence in mainstream Anglophone philosophy -- better than Google Scholar and Web of Science.

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In all, 2025 was an unusually productive writing year, though I worry I may be spreading myself too thin. I can’t resist chasing new thoughts and arguments. I have an idea; I want to think about it; I think by writing.

May 2026 be as fertile!