Since 2003, I've regularly taught a large lower-division class called "Evil", focusing primarily on the moral psychology of evil (recent syllabus here). We conclude by discussing the theological "problem of evil" -- the question of whether and how evil and suffering are possible given an omnipotent, omniscient, benevolent God. Over the years I've been increasingly intrigued by a secular version of this question.
I keep coming back to this post. The idea of a morally well-ordered universe is slightly blowing my mind, as I try to figure out what that might be...
I think with a god that exists external to the universe, it's fairly easy to understand how the god can set a moral code, and the beings in the universe can either follow it or not follow it.
But in the secular form of the argument, the relationship between the moral code and the actions of beings in the universe seems to be intrinsically more complicated. For example, if the moral code is consequentialist, then the morally well-ordered world *by definition* imposes not just severe but total impingements on our freedom. We would have no ability to act badly without being punished, because the punishment (to ourselves or others) would be exactly what the badness consists in.
If the morality is deontological instead of consequentialist, then the connection is less direct, I think, but still present, because the moral rules must be emergent features of the universe itself.
In a virtue ethics version of morality, the question of human nature would seem to be begged: the definition of goodness must be drawn from human nature in some way, so the question of whether human nature inevitably tends in this direction must be at least a partial/oblique/qualified affirmative.
That is to say, whereas in the religious version of the argument, you can draw a clean line between the standards that define the moral code and the application of the moral code; in the secular version that line seems to be necessarily blurred.
I keep coming back to this post. The idea of a morally well-ordered universe is slightly blowing my mind, as I try to figure out what that might be...
I think with a god that exists external to the universe, it's fairly easy to understand how the god can set a moral code, and the beings in the universe can either follow it or not follow it.
But in the secular form of the argument, the relationship between the moral code and the actions of beings in the universe seems to be intrinsically more complicated. For example, if the moral code is consequentialist, then the morally well-ordered world *by definition* imposes not just severe but total impingements on our freedom. We would have no ability to act badly without being punished, because the punishment (to ourselves or others) would be exactly what the badness consists in.
If the morality is deontological instead of consequentialist, then the connection is less direct, I think, but still present, because the moral rules must be emergent features of the universe itself.
In a virtue ethics version of morality, the question of human nature would seem to be begged: the definition of goodness must be drawn from human nature in some way, so the question of whether human nature inevitably tends in this direction must be at least a partial/oblique/qualified affirmative.
That is to say, whereas in the religious version of the argument, you can draw a clean line between the standards that define the moral code and the application of the moral code; in the secular version that line seems to be necessarily blurred.