Since 2003, I've regularly taught a large lower-division class called "Evil", focusing primarily on the moral psychology of evil (recent syllabus here). We conclude by discussing the theological "problem of evil" -- the question of whether and how evil and suffering are possible given an omnipotent, omniscient, benevolent God. Over the years I've been increasingly intrigued by a secular version of this question.
Thanks Eric. To consider this question fully it might be particularly instructive to consider the existence of non-human animal agriculture and exploitation as a case study? Particularly if we consider a sentiocentric (or Sentientist) moral scope that recognises the moral patiency of every sentient being - and the serious moral wrong of needlessly exploiting, harming or killing any sentient being as a result.
Indeed. Particularly when we remember that the worst parts of factory farming from the animals' perspectives are also completely standard practices in non-factory farming and fishing. And when we consider the mind-boggling number of sentient minds impacted and ended.
I keep coming back to this post. The idea of a morally well-ordered universe is slightly blowing my mind, as I try to figure out what that might be...
I think with a god that exists external to the universe, it's fairly easy to understand how the god can set a moral code, and the beings in the universe can either follow it or not follow it.
But in the secular form of the argument, the relationship between the moral code and the actions of beings in the universe seems to be intrinsically more complicated. For example, if the moral code is consequentialist, then the morally well-ordered world *by definition* imposes not just severe but total impingements on our freedom. We would have no ability to act badly without being punished, because the punishment (to ourselves or others) would be exactly what the badness consists in.
If the morality is deontological instead of consequentialist, then the connection is less direct, I think, but still present, because the moral rules must be emergent features of the universe itself.
In a virtue ethics version of morality, the question of human nature would seem to be begged: the definition of goodness must be drawn from human nature in some way, so the question of whether human nature inevitably tends in this direction must be at least a partial/oblique/qualified affirmative.
That is to say, whereas in the religious version of the argument, you can draw a clean line between the standards that define the moral code and the application of the moral code; in the secular version that line seems to be necessarily blurred.
I think these can be pulled apart. Virtue ethics, for example, needn't define the good in terms of what we naturally tend toward. Arguably, Confucius is a virtue ethicist who doesn't think we tend naturally toward the good.
Yeah, but his ideas came from somewhere. He couches it in terms of the golden age of the Zhou, when some particular combination of wisdom in the ruler and positive political circumstances prevailed. The Duke of Zhou was human, and represents a human ideal. So the definition of what the ideal is still comes from within the scope of human experience. I guess I misstated it above: Confucius wouldn't be saying there's an inevitable tendency towards the ideal, he'd be saying that the ideal is one of the tendencies that can happen. And having observed it happen once, during the golden age, we should strive to recreate that tendency.
Thanks Eric. To consider this question fully it might be particularly instructive to consider the existence of non-human animal agriculture and exploitation as a case study? Particularly if we consider a sentiocentric (or Sentientist) moral scope that recognises the moral patiency of every sentient being - and the serious moral wrong of needlessly exploiting, harming or killing any sentient being as a result.
Yes, to the extent animal exploitation through factory farms is morally bad, the positive case for moral order becomes more difficult to make.
Indeed. Particularly when we remember that the worst parts of factory farming from the animals' perspectives are also completely standard practices in non-factory farming and fishing. And when we consider the mind-boggling number of sentient minds impacted and ended.
I keep coming back to this post. The idea of a morally well-ordered universe is slightly blowing my mind, as I try to figure out what that might be...
I think with a god that exists external to the universe, it's fairly easy to understand how the god can set a moral code, and the beings in the universe can either follow it or not follow it.
But in the secular form of the argument, the relationship between the moral code and the actions of beings in the universe seems to be intrinsically more complicated. For example, if the moral code is consequentialist, then the morally well-ordered world *by definition* imposes not just severe but total impingements on our freedom. We would have no ability to act badly without being punished, because the punishment (to ourselves or others) would be exactly what the badness consists in.
If the morality is deontological instead of consequentialist, then the connection is less direct, I think, but still present, because the moral rules must be emergent features of the universe itself.
In a virtue ethics version of morality, the question of human nature would seem to be begged: the definition of goodness must be drawn from human nature in some way, so the question of whether human nature inevitably tends in this direction must be at least a partial/oblique/qualified affirmative.
That is to say, whereas in the religious version of the argument, you can draw a clean line between the standards that define the moral code and the application of the moral code; in the secular version that line seems to be necessarily blurred.
I think these can be pulled apart. Virtue ethics, for example, needn't define the good in terms of what we naturally tend toward. Arguably, Confucius is a virtue ethicist who doesn't think we tend naturally toward the good.
Yeah, but his ideas came from somewhere. He couches it in terms of the golden age of the Zhou, when some particular combination of wisdom in the ruler and positive political circumstances prevailed. The Duke of Zhou was human, and represents a human ideal. So the definition of what the ideal is still comes from within the scope of human experience. I guess I misstated it above: Confucius wouldn't be saying there's an inevitable tendency towards the ideal, he'd be saying that the ideal is one of the tendencies that can happen. And having observed it happen once, during the golden age, we should strive to recreate that tendency.
Yes, that seems right!