I'm back from travel to Paris and Antwerp, where I spoke with people influenced by, and critical of, my "dispositionalist" approach to belief. A critique of my work has also just appeared in the journal Theoria. It's an honor to be criticized!
I’m very sympathetic but I have a quibble. Or maybe two. Let’s agree that the skater who believes the ice is thin is disposed to skate warily and etc. Doesn’t she have that disposition (in this case) because she believes what she does? Her reason for being disposed to skate warily is that, as she sees it, the ice is thin. So I’m worried your account can’t get the link between what a person believes and how they are disposed to act quite right. That’s my first quibble. The second one concerns what manifests or reveals her belief when she does skate warily. I’m not sure her wary skating manifests her belief. She might skate warily for all kinds of reasons. Maybe she is hoping to win a bet that requires that she skate warily. What manifests her belief, when she skates warily, is the fact that she is skating warily because, as she sees it, the ice is thin. It is her acting for that reason that manifests her belief. I worry your account gets the manifestation of belief wrong. These are quibbles. But I’d be curious to hear how you think belief links up with having a reason for being disposed and for acting.
Thanks for the thoughtful and challenging comment, David!
On the first quibble, I have two thoughts.
First, as usual, I think comparison with personality traits is helpful. What is the link between being an extravert and enthusiastically agreeing to the party invitation this weekend? It's certainly fine to say that our friend enthusiastically agreed *because* she is an extravert. But we don't need to appeal to an interior switch set to "E" doing the causal work to avail ourselves of this explanation. In the skater case, we can similarly say that she skates warily because she believes that the ice is this. But this does not require appealing to an inner representation of the form "the ice is thin" that does the causal work. The reason she is disposed to skate warily is that she believes the ice is thin; the reason Gillian is disposed to say yes to party invitations is that she is an extravert. We get parallel reason-style explanations in both cases without need for appeal to inner causes.
Second, of course there is *some* causation happening inside. Maybe we can even grant the representationalist the idea that there is a representation with the content "the ice is thin" stored in long term memory. At a subpersonal level, then, we might say that the wary skating is partly caused by that internal representation. Granting all this for the sake of argument, what makes it true that Gillian believes is that she has the dispositional profile. The representation only matters because it is what enables Gillian to have dispositional profile constitutive of belief. As we can see, however, by imagining the dispositions without the representation or the representation without the dispositions, belief is really about having the dispositions. The representation is just what facilitates that.
On the second quibble, again I invite the comparison to personality traits. One might enthusiastically agree to a party invitation for many reasons -- to please the boss, because one wants to see the neighbor's new pool, etc. What makes Gillian's "yes" a manifestation of her extraversion is her overall dispositional profile, including across counterfactual cases. Same for the wary skater. If she's skating warily to win a bet, the rest of her dispositions, and the counterfactual structure, will look very different than if that's a manifestation of her belief that the ice is thin.
My question is about how a person’s beliefs relate to their dispositions, and to how what they believe makes their dispositions rational. I worry that identifying beliefs and sets of dispositions misses that. Here is another attempt at the same topic.
It seems to me that two people can have the very same beliefs and desires and yet very different dispositions, and rationally so. Indeed, it would usually be a little irrational for them to have the same dispositions. This, I think, is one lesson of the classic case where the bear attacks Jones who is out walking with Simon. It seems to me that Jones and Simon can agree on all the facts, and desire the same things for themselves and for the other and yet have very different dispositions. Jones is disposed to drop into a ball; Simon is disposed to run for help. The fact that the bear is attacking Jones is a good reason for Jones to drop into a ball and a good reason for a Simon to run for help. They agree on this. And so Jones drops and Simon runs. Very different behaviour and very different dispositions with no difference in beliefs or desires. And the differences are rational.
What makes the difference in dispositions rational is that one fact is a reason for Jones to do one thing but a reason for smith to do something else. What a given fact gives a person reason to do depends on who they are and what else is true of them.
Now maybe you will say I am not individuating dispositions properly and that they really have the same dispositions. Maybe but I find this hard to imagine. Or maybe you will say I am overlooking some difference in what they believe. Some might say that only Jones believes, in that special first-personal way, that the bear is attacking him. And some think this is the real lesson of the bear case. But is this something you want to say? I don’t. I don’t think there are essentially private self-locating beliefs.
Do you think Jones and Simon must differ in what they believe or desire? (Their intentions will be different once they each finish deliberating about what to do. But , as it were, there is no difference in the inputs to that deliberation.)
I’d rather say that two people can have the same beliefs and desires but differ in their rational dispositions. And so beliefs (and desires) cannot be identified with sets of dispositions. (Unless I am mis-individuating dispositions.)
But like you I also resist the idea that believing involves internal representations.
I'm not sure I fully understand the case. Maybe Jones and Smith differ in personality. If so, they might differ in disposition despite having the same beliefs and desires. I'm not committed to saying that one's set of beliefs and desires fully determines one's dispositional structure. Still, realistically, people with different personality traits will have different desires. Maybe seeing the bear triggers in Jones and intense desire to curl up into a ball, while it produces a different desire in Simon?
Or is this meant to be an "essential indexical" kind of case, where both Jones and Simon intensely want Jones to curl into a ball and both Jones and Simon want Simon to run for help? In response to that: If the content of desires can be indexical -- and I don't see why it can't be -- then they would differ in desires: Jones wants <I curl into a ball> and Simon does not want <I curl into a ball>. On certain views of the nature of attitude contents and the nature of propositions, maybe I can't avail myself of that escape from the worry, but maybe we should take that as a reductio of having the conjunction of philosophical views that produces the worry.
I was trying to abstract from differences in personality and character. I take your view to be that any given belief state has an associated set of dispositions. Being in that state involves having enough of the dispositions in that set. It seems to me, though, that which dispositions a person will come to have upon entering a belief state will vary from person to person, not because of differences in their character or personality, but because what it will be reasonable for them to do given that belief will vary from person to person. The bear case was meant to illustrate that. Even if Jones and Smith have the same personality and character, and all the same beliefs and desires, their dispositions will be different, and rationally so, after they start believing that the bear is attacking Jones. This shows that we can’t easily associate beliefs and dispositions, because what it is reasonable for a person to do, think, or feel upon starting to believe something depends on what else is true of them, and this has nothing to do with differences in personality or character.
But this is compatible with agreeing that a change in belief involves a change in dispositions. And it is compatible with denying that believing involves (internal) representations. My worry is that your dispositionalism obscures the rational connection between believing something and being disposed to do, think, and feel things. The bear case was meant to bring this out.
I am sceptical that appealing to essentially private beliefs will help much. I’m not sure how to specify the dispositional sets associated with them. And we don’t need to if we instead highlight how a given belief provides different reasons to different people. One original attraction of the dispositional view of belief is that it emphasizes the publicity of belief. In my 2022 book I discuss essentially first-personal beliefs in some detail.
Thanks, David! I've read parts of your 2022, but I'm not now recalling your line on first-personal beliefs. I'll refresh myself on that. However, pending my review of your discussion of the matter, it doesn't seem to me that the belief "a bear is attacking me" presents especially more difficult a problem for the dispositionalist than "there's beer in the fridge". In both cases, specifying the dispositional set is going to depend on folk psychology and the dispositions will always be relativized, implicitly or explicitly, to desires, other beliefs, and other mental states (e.g., "going to the fridge if I want a beer", "curling up in a ball if I believe that's the best way to stay safe).
I’m very sympathetic but I have a quibble. Or maybe two. Let’s agree that the skater who believes the ice is thin is disposed to skate warily and etc. Doesn’t she have that disposition (in this case) because she believes what she does? Her reason for being disposed to skate warily is that, as she sees it, the ice is thin. So I’m worried your account can’t get the link between what a person believes and how they are disposed to act quite right. That’s my first quibble. The second one concerns what manifests or reveals her belief when she does skate warily. I’m not sure her wary skating manifests her belief. She might skate warily for all kinds of reasons. Maybe she is hoping to win a bet that requires that she skate warily. What manifests her belief, when she skates warily, is the fact that she is skating warily because, as she sees it, the ice is thin. It is her acting for that reason that manifests her belief. I worry your account gets the manifestation of belief wrong. These are quibbles. But I’d be curious to hear how you think belief links up with having a reason for being disposed and for acting.
Thanks for the thoughtful and challenging comment, David!
On the first quibble, I have two thoughts.
First, as usual, I think comparison with personality traits is helpful. What is the link between being an extravert and enthusiastically agreeing to the party invitation this weekend? It's certainly fine to say that our friend enthusiastically agreed *because* she is an extravert. But we don't need to appeal to an interior switch set to "E" doing the causal work to avail ourselves of this explanation. In the skater case, we can similarly say that she skates warily because she believes that the ice is this. But this does not require appealing to an inner representation of the form "the ice is thin" that does the causal work. The reason she is disposed to skate warily is that she believes the ice is thin; the reason Gillian is disposed to say yes to party invitations is that she is an extravert. We get parallel reason-style explanations in both cases without need for appeal to inner causes.
Second, of course there is *some* causation happening inside. Maybe we can even grant the representationalist the idea that there is a representation with the content "the ice is thin" stored in long term memory. At a subpersonal level, then, we might say that the wary skating is partly caused by that internal representation. Granting all this for the sake of argument, what makes it true that Gillian believes is that she has the dispositional profile. The representation only matters because it is what enables Gillian to have dispositional profile constitutive of belief. As we can see, however, by imagining the dispositions without the representation or the representation without the dispositions, belief is really about having the dispositions. The representation is just what facilitates that.
On the second quibble, again I invite the comparison to personality traits. One might enthusiastically agree to a party invitation for many reasons -- to please the boss, because one wants to see the neighbor's new pool, etc. What makes Gillian's "yes" a manifestation of her extraversion is her overall dispositional profile, including across counterfactual cases. Same for the wary skater. If she's skating warily to win a bet, the rest of her dispositions, and the counterfactual structure, will look very different than if that's a manifestation of her belief that the ice is thin.
Sorry for the excessively long answer!
My question is about how a person’s beliefs relate to their dispositions, and to how what they believe makes their dispositions rational. I worry that identifying beliefs and sets of dispositions misses that. Here is another attempt at the same topic.
It seems to me that two people can have the very same beliefs and desires and yet very different dispositions, and rationally so. Indeed, it would usually be a little irrational for them to have the same dispositions. This, I think, is one lesson of the classic case where the bear attacks Jones who is out walking with Simon. It seems to me that Jones and Simon can agree on all the facts, and desire the same things for themselves and for the other and yet have very different dispositions. Jones is disposed to drop into a ball; Simon is disposed to run for help. The fact that the bear is attacking Jones is a good reason for Jones to drop into a ball and a good reason for a Simon to run for help. They agree on this. And so Jones drops and Simon runs. Very different behaviour and very different dispositions with no difference in beliefs or desires. And the differences are rational.
What makes the difference in dispositions rational is that one fact is a reason for Jones to do one thing but a reason for smith to do something else. What a given fact gives a person reason to do depends on who they are and what else is true of them.
Now maybe you will say I am not individuating dispositions properly and that they really have the same dispositions. Maybe but I find this hard to imagine. Or maybe you will say I am overlooking some difference in what they believe. Some might say that only Jones believes, in that special first-personal way, that the bear is attacking him. And some think this is the real lesson of the bear case. But is this something you want to say? I don’t. I don’t think there are essentially private self-locating beliefs.
Do you think Jones and Simon must differ in what they believe or desire? (Their intentions will be different once they each finish deliberating about what to do. But , as it were, there is no difference in the inputs to that deliberation.)
I’d rather say that two people can have the same beliefs and desires but differ in their rational dispositions. And so beliefs (and desires) cannot be identified with sets of dispositions. (Unless I am mis-individuating dispositions.)
But like you I also resist the idea that believing involves internal representations.
I'm not sure I fully understand the case. Maybe Jones and Smith differ in personality. If so, they might differ in disposition despite having the same beliefs and desires. I'm not committed to saying that one's set of beliefs and desires fully determines one's dispositional structure. Still, realistically, people with different personality traits will have different desires. Maybe seeing the bear triggers in Jones and intense desire to curl up into a ball, while it produces a different desire in Simon?
Or is this meant to be an "essential indexical" kind of case, where both Jones and Simon intensely want Jones to curl into a ball and both Jones and Simon want Simon to run for help? In response to that: If the content of desires can be indexical -- and I don't see why it can't be -- then they would differ in desires: Jones wants <I curl into a ball> and Simon does not want <I curl into a ball>. On certain views of the nature of attitude contents and the nature of propositions, maybe I can't avail myself of that escape from the worry, but maybe we should take that as a reductio of having the conjunction of philosophical views that produces the worry.
I was trying to abstract from differences in personality and character. I take your view to be that any given belief state has an associated set of dispositions. Being in that state involves having enough of the dispositions in that set. It seems to me, though, that which dispositions a person will come to have upon entering a belief state will vary from person to person, not because of differences in their character or personality, but because what it will be reasonable for them to do given that belief will vary from person to person. The bear case was meant to illustrate that. Even if Jones and Smith have the same personality and character, and all the same beliefs and desires, their dispositions will be different, and rationally so, after they start believing that the bear is attacking Jones. This shows that we can’t easily associate beliefs and dispositions, because what it is reasonable for a person to do, think, or feel upon starting to believe something depends on what else is true of them, and this has nothing to do with differences in personality or character.
But this is compatible with agreeing that a change in belief involves a change in dispositions. And it is compatible with denying that believing involves (internal) representations. My worry is that your dispositionalism obscures the rational connection between believing something and being disposed to do, think, and feel things. The bear case was meant to bring this out.
I am sceptical that appealing to essentially private beliefs will help much. I’m not sure how to specify the dispositional sets associated with them. And we don’t need to if we instead highlight how a given belief provides different reasons to different people. One original attraction of the dispositional view of belief is that it emphasizes the publicity of belief. In my 2022 book I discuss essentially first-personal beliefs in some detail.
Thanks, David! I've read parts of your 2022, but I'm not now recalling your line on first-personal beliefs. I'll refresh myself on that. However, pending my review of your discussion of the matter, it doesn't seem to me that the belief "a bear is attacking me" presents especially more difficult a problem for the dispositionalist than "there's beer in the fridge". In both cases, specifying the dispositional set is going to depend on folk psychology and the dispositions will always be relativized, implicitly or explicitly, to desires, other beliefs, and other mental states (e.g., "going to the fridge if I want a beer", "curling up in a ball if I believe that's the best way to stay safe).