(1) To what extent do you think representation itself is susceptible to a dispositionalist account? (Alternatively: Are representation-ascriptions reducible in principle to disposition-ascriptions?)
(2) Would an attempt to reconcile dispositionalist and representationalist accounts of belief[-ascriptions] by giving a dispositionalist account of representation[-ascriptions] end up being basically the same as what you are doing here, or would it be fundamentally different?
I’m basically a Dretskean about representations as states with an indicator function. Whether these can be cashed out dispositionally, I’m unsure. But if not, then the present ideas aren’t equivalent — and in any case they are simpler in the sense of not depending on that.
The post spells out a relationship between "dispositions" and "architectures," but it doesn't specify what a "representation" is. (The post's title uses the phrase "representational architecture," but the body does not.)
Since Schwitzgebel is claiming his account is compatible with a representationalist analysis, it's reasonable to ask exactly where we might locate "representations" in his picture. Are they (i) physical architectures, (ii) dispositions, (iii) relationships between physical architectures and dispositions, (iv) a third metaphysical layer between the other two (the delicious filling of the metaphysical sandwich?), or (v) something else?
Since Schwitzgebel says he is uncertain whether his own Dretskean understanding of representation can be cashed out in terms of dispositions, I am guessing he doesn't think his sketch of two-layer metaphysics is sufficient to answer the question.
The Blogger links all seem to be broken. (Or maybe it's that Blogger doesn't make them accessible to people without accounts?)
Thanks for the catch -- weird! Fixing now.
Links are working now!
On the substance of the post:
(1) To what extent do you think representation itself is susceptible to a dispositionalist account? (Alternatively: Are representation-ascriptions reducible in principle to disposition-ascriptions?)
(2) Would an attempt to reconcile dispositionalist and representationalist accounts of belief[-ascriptions] by giving a dispositionalist account of representation[-ascriptions] end up being basically the same as what you are doing here, or would it be fundamentally different?
I’m basically a Dretskean about representations as states with an indicator function. Whether these can be cashed out dispositionally, I’m unsure. But if not, then the present ideas aren’t equivalent — and in any case they are simpler in the sense of not depending on that.
Quiop
Isn't the answer to your question already contained in Schwitzgebel's description of two layered metaphysics?
Granted, my philosophical education is not near yours.
If I am wrong please explain that I might know.
Thank you for your time.
The post spells out a relationship between "dispositions" and "architectures," but it doesn't specify what a "representation" is. (The post's title uses the phrase "representational architecture," but the body does not.)
Since Schwitzgebel is claiming his account is compatible with a representationalist analysis, it's reasonable to ask exactly where we might locate "representations" in his picture. Are they (i) physical architectures, (ii) dispositions, (iii) relationships between physical architectures and dispositions, (iv) a third metaphysical layer between the other two (the delicious filling of the metaphysical sandwich?), or (v) something else?
Since Schwitzgebel says he is uncertain whether his own Dretskean understanding of representation can be cashed out in terms of dispositions, I am guessing he doesn't think his sketch of two-layer metaphysics is sufficient to answer the question.
Thanks Quiop
Brilliantly said and proven with even some humor. If only everyone who proved me wrong were so kind.