Thanks for the commentary! Like Julia, I have not read Neil's book, but your summary and objections were laid out very clearly so it's tempting to share a couple questions now. (For transparency I am not at all religious, but intend this in a way that could leave open the possibility of religious belief as factually correct and not just credal).
If religious credence is not supposed to or doesn't need to respond to factual beliefs, to me this is consistent with what religious friends have told me about the nature of faith, which is that "proof" or "evidence" is kind of beside the point - it's more about willingness and openness to believe (or *try* to believe) - and the effort to hold onto that faith in the face of inevitable doubt - as much as being sure or degrees of confidence. It's a spiritual practice, more than an epistemological one. So like you, I see this in the middle rather than entirely distinct from belief - but I'm not sure any of the examples discussed here really capture what I described above, which is neither "make-believe" nor emotionally-loaded/favored attitudes nor percentage confidence, but more like a spirit of openness and willingness to listen for that voice. Is this "belief-ish"? I'm not sure.
Second, I wonder if Creationism is the best representative example because that's quite literal and quantified, so of course it's easy to see the conflict with factual beliefs. The earth can't be both 6 million years old *and* 6000 years old. But simply being willing to believe in God or the possibility of miracles or other religious beliefs could point toward a different realm and logic outside of earthly facts and logic, rather than one directly in conflict - no?
Finally (and this is where my nonbelief shows): I wondered if Neil gets at all into genealogical debunking and how the way someone's religious beliefs developed might bear on whether it should be evaluated as credence or misbelief. For instance, if someone grew up in a repressive, ideological Christian family or community, I might feel more inclined to view these as beliefs but then question them critically due to suspicions of brainwashing, than put them in a special category where they might not be accountable to evidence. But perhaps I am being inconsistent here.
Thanks for this thoughtful comment, Chris! I'm inclined to think of belief as not *needing* to be responsive to evidence. On creationism: Right, maybe not typical, but I think it's useful to have an example of flat disagreement, as a test of the two-maps view. On misbelief: I think all parties can agree that there are healthy and unhealthy ways to form religious attitudes; none of us need to abandon that idea.
Hi Eric, I have not read Van Leeuwen's book, but I wonder if he says anything about the rationality of "religiously creeding"? If religious attitudes are beliefs, we can evaluate whether they are rational based on their responsiveness to evidence or the reliability of the means by which they were formed or [some other standard way of assessing epistemic justification]. But how do we evaluate the rationality of religious attitudes?
Our map for beliefs can be evaluated on how accurate it is and on the means by which we formed it; how is our map for religious attitudes evaluated?
As someone who has religious beliefs, I feel very sympathetic to your third criticism. When I have religious beliefs that I perceive as in tention with my non-religious beliefs, I feel uncomfortable. And when I act in ways that are inconsistent with my religious beliefs, the phenomenology of that experience is similar to the phenomenology of akrasia.
Yes, much of Neil's book is about the rationality of religious credence. He thinks that since it doesn't have to accord with factual belief, there's no irrationality when it conflicts with what one factually believes. It doesn't respond to evidence, but it's not supposed to, so it's failure to do so is not a failure of rationality, as he sees it!
I'd say this is true of people who subscribe to most any ideology, and might be expressed as "The degree to which an individual's actions and realtime cognition is consistent with their ideological scriptures".
Looking at it from this perspective, the creme de la creme, Scientists / The Science, does not look so fantastic, and it goes a long ways to explaining why everything is so screwed up: no one knows what's going on, including those who claim to / are believed to.
Thanks for the commentary! Like Julia, I have not read Neil's book, but your summary and objections were laid out very clearly so it's tempting to share a couple questions now. (For transparency I am not at all religious, but intend this in a way that could leave open the possibility of religious belief as factually correct and not just credal).
If religious credence is not supposed to or doesn't need to respond to factual beliefs, to me this is consistent with what religious friends have told me about the nature of faith, which is that "proof" or "evidence" is kind of beside the point - it's more about willingness and openness to believe (or *try* to believe) - and the effort to hold onto that faith in the face of inevitable doubt - as much as being sure or degrees of confidence. It's a spiritual practice, more than an epistemological one. So like you, I see this in the middle rather than entirely distinct from belief - but I'm not sure any of the examples discussed here really capture what I described above, which is neither "make-believe" nor emotionally-loaded/favored attitudes nor percentage confidence, but more like a spirit of openness and willingness to listen for that voice. Is this "belief-ish"? I'm not sure.
Second, I wonder if Creationism is the best representative example because that's quite literal and quantified, so of course it's easy to see the conflict with factual beliefs. The earth can't be both 6 million years old *and* 6000 years old. But simply being willing to believe in God or the possibility of miracles or other religious beliefs could point toward a different realm and logic outside of earthly facts and logic, rather than one directly in conflict - no?
Finally (and this is where my nonbelief shows): I wondered if Neil gets at all into genealogical debunking and how the way someone's religious beliefs developed might bear on whether it should be evaluated as credence or misbelief. For instance, if someone grew up in a repressive, ideological Christian family or community, I might feel more inclined to view these as beliefs but then question them critically due to suspicions of brainwashing, than put them in a special category where they might not be accountable to evidence. But perhaps I am being inconsistent here.
Thanks for this thoughtful comment, Chris! I'm inclined to think of belief as not *needing* to be responsive to evidence. On creationism: Right, maybe not typical, but I think it's useful to have an example of flat disagreement, as a test of the two-maps view. On misbelief: I think all parties can agree that there are healthy and unhealthy ways to form religious attitudes; none of us need to abandon that idea.
Hi Eric, I have not read Van Leeuwen's book, but I wonder if he says anything about the rationality of "religiously creeding"? If religious attitudes are beliefs, we can evaluate whether they are rational based on their responsiveness to evidence or the reliability of the means by which they were formed or [some other standard way of assessing epistemic justification]. But how do we evaluate the rationality of religious attitudes?
Our map for beliefs can be evaluated on how accurate it is and on the means by which we formed it; how is our map for religious attitudes evaluated?
As someone who has religious beliefs, I feel very sympathetic to your third criticism. When I have religious beliefs that I perceive as in tention with my non-religious beliefs, I feel uncomfortable. And when I act in ways that are inconsistent with my religious beliefs, the phenomenology of that experience is similar to the phenomenology of akrasia.
Yes, much of Neil's book is about the rationality of religious credence. He thinks that since it doesn't have to accord with factual belief, there's no irrationality when it conflicts with what one factually believes. It doesn't respond to evidence, but it's not supposed to, so it's failure to do so is not a failure of rationality, as he sees it!
So are there any irrational or otherwise unacceptable religious attitudes then, according to him?
Sure, *if* one treats them as factual or if one does the “make-believe” badly enough.
I'm now wondering what the point of having religious attitudes would be on a view like this. I guess I'll need to read the book!
I'd say this is true of people who subscribe to most any ideology, and might be expressed as "The degree to which an individual's actions and realtime cognition is consistent with their ideological scriptures".
Looking at it from this perspective, the creme de la creme, Scientists / The Science, does not look so fantastic, and it goes a long ways to explaining why everything is so screwed up: no one knows what's going on, including those who claim to / are believed to.
Delusion and hubris will be humanity's downfall.